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THE MECHANICS OF INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM LITIGATION
*A. David Reynolds
I. Introduction
In recent years the courts have experienced an increase in the
number of large scale public interest lawsuits. Much of this in-
crease has been in the form of institutional reform litigation di-
rected at state or local governmental bodies to insure their compli-
ance with the growing number of constitutional and statutory
rights every individual enjoys. Federal courts have, as a result, be-
come involved in the administration of schools,' prisons, 2 mental
institutions' and many other public bodies.4
This new activism of the courts has been the focus of much de-
bate both within and outside the legal profession. Critics argue
that too much judicial involvement in the operation of government
is constitutionally inappropriate, threatens the health of our demo-
cratic institutions, and brings the judiciary into disrepute.5 Defend-
* Assistant Professor, University of Louisville School of Law. B.S. 1970, University of
Pennsylvania. J.D. 1974, University of San Francisco. L.L.M. 1976, Harvard Law School.
1. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267 (1977); School Dist. of Omaha v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977); Morgan v.
McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977) (public school
placed in receivership to implement desegregation plan). See Roberts, The Extent of Federal
Judicial Equitable Power: Receivership of South Boston High School, 12 NEW ENO. L. REv.
55 (1976); Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d
37 (2d Cir. 1975); Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga. 1966).
2. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part sub nom. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Robbins &
Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Fed-
eral Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29
STAN. L. Rev. 893 (1977); Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Rhem v.
Malcolm, 432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of
Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Nagel].
3. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in
part, decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);
Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change,
84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975) (hereinafter cited as The Wyatt Case].
4. See Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (reorganization of city
government), aff'd, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 439 U.S. 815 (1978).
5. See Nagel, supra note 2; Aldisert, The Role of the Courts in Contemporary Society, 38
U. Prrr. L. REv. 437 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Aldisert]; see also Nat'l Conference on the
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ers note that judicial action is made necessary only because the
target institution has failed in its legal obligations and that these
suits are generally aimed at protecting the rights of minorities and
other politically impotent groups who do not have effective re-
course to other branches of government. Professor Chayes has ar-
gued that these suits are part of a new breed of lawsuit which he
has called public law litigation.' He has suggested that these suits
are, in fact, structurally different from traditional litigation and
have emerged, in part, because of a liberalization 6f procedural
rules allowing many diverse parties to present relatively broad
questions for judicial review in a single litigation.' As a result,
these lawsuits are said to be a very effective way for representative
elements of the community to come together and attack major lo-
cal problems.'
The purpose of this article is not to add to the debate, but rather
to help make it more informed by providing some insight into the
process of litigating these suits." The history of two large public
interest lawsuits will be reviewed with special emphasis given to
three particular problems: breadth of representation, formulation
of remedies and enforcement of court decrees.
The question of breadth of representation is important because
of the traditional charge that social reform through the courts is
inherently undemocratic"' and can very well lead to results that are
in conflict with the desires and needs of the social groups to be
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976),
especially addresses delivered by S. Rifkind, id. at 96, and E. Levi, id. at 212. For a more
balanced discussion see A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT 76-118 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cox].
6. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Chayes]; Denvir, Towards a Political Theory of Public Interest
Litigation, 54 N.C. L. REV. 1133 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Denvir]; Note, Developments in
the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1227-50 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Developments-Section 1983].
7. Chayes, supra note 6.
8. Id. at 1289-92.
9. See id. at 1310-13.
10. See D. HOROwrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Horowitz]; Developments-Section 1983, supra note 6, at 1227-50; The Wyatt Case, supra
note 3. For a general discussion of the dynamics of public interest law see B. WEJSBROD, J.
HANDLER & N. KOMESAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LAw: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
(1978).
11. See Horowitz, supra note 10, at 17-19; Denvir, supra note 6, at 1153-59.
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affected." Protagonists defend contemporary public interest suits
from this charge by countering that class action devices, liberal
joinder and intervention make the suits akin to a legislative process
because all interested groups have an opportunity to be effectively
represented."3 The chosen cases will be reviewed to examine the de-
gree of community participation that they have attracted and will
be analyzed in terms of the effectiveness of that participation.
Formulation of remedies in institutional reform cases also
presents special problems for the court. The constitutional or statu-
tory standards usually involved rarely give the court guidance as to
how violations should be corrected. A finding that defendant's neg-
ligence proximately caused plaintiff's personal injury easily sug-
gests the remedy of money damages. However, no simple solution
flows from the finding that a large public institution discriminates
against a minority or fails to provide adequate treatment for those
under its care. In such situations the problem of a remedy becomes
much more difficult. For example, the nature of discrimination in a
large organization is such that its effects are often widespread and
complex, and are manifested in subtle forms that are hard to de-
tect. Judges are trained neither to perceive the unique characteris-
tics of these situations nor to devise solutions that will prevent con-
tinued discrimination without unjustifiably burdening the
defendant institution. It has been argued, on the other hand, that
courts are effectively overcoming this problem by prescribing reme-
dies only after extensive consultation with the defendant, the other
interested parties, and in some cases, outside experts.1" When the
relief comes in the form of a consent decree, reached through nego-
tiations between the court and all interested groups, as it often
does, there is a further assurance that an appropriate balance has
been struck between the competing interests. The chosen cases will
be examined to see the roles played by the participants in formu-
lating any relief. They will also be evaluated in terms of the appro-
priate balance in public interest cases between mediation or negoti-
ation as opposed to traditional adjudication.
Given the formulation of an appropriate remedial decree, the
subsequent problem of judicial enforcement remains. If the case is
12. See Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 H~Av. L. REv. 1667, 1760-70
(1975).
13. See Chayes, supra note 6, at 1310-13.
14. See id. at 1298-1302.
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politically controversial there is always the danger that the public
entity defendant will openly refuse to comply with court orders. In
such a situation the judiciary may be unable to enforce its orders.
Furthermore, there is also the problem of preventing more subtle
forms of noncompliance. It may be impossible, without close court
supervision, to assure compliance with a decree which significantly
reorders the conduct of a large organization. This is an uninviting
prospect, considering the limited judicial resources and the unde-
sirability of -continuing judicial intrusion into other public bodies.
By reviewing some of the enforcement problems encountered in the
selected cases, this article will attempt to determine the extent to
which these concerns are justified.
The chosen subjects involve employment discrimination cases
brought against the police department of the city of Philadelphia.
The first suit, Pennsylvania v. O'Neill5 (O'Neill), was filed in late
1970 and focused on racial discrimination. The second suit, really
two consolidated cases, Brace v. O'Neill" and United States v. City
of Philadelphia7 (hereinafter jointly referred to as Brace), was
commenced in early 1974 and was directed at sex discrimination.
Both suits were filed in the United States District Court in Phila-
delphia and were assigned to different judges.
These cases will be examined because they provide an opportu-
nity to compare and contrast two public interest suits in which dif-
ferent approaches are used to attack similar problems. At the time
of this writing, neither case has been prosecuted to a final judg-
ment." Nevertheless, a decade's worth of combined litigation pro-
vides ample material for an evaluation of these cases.
IH. The Lawsuits - A Summary
A. The O'Neill Case
When Frank Rizzo was named Police Commissioner of the Phila-
delphia Police Department in May 1967, he had already earned a
15. No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970).
16. No. 74-339 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 12, 1974).
17. No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974).
18. The city's hiring and promotion practices were challenged in these actions. However,
remedial action regarding the city's promotion practices has not been well developed or has
been found inappropriate. See Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 465 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
Consequently, this article focuses on the hiring question.
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negative reputation among some local minority groups.'" During
the next several years he drew national attention as police commis-
sioner with his outspoken manner and reputed harassment of mi-
norities and dissenters, particularly black radicals. 0 In 1970 alone,
several suits were filed on behalf of minorities seeking broad equi-
table relief to protect them from alleged police abuse.2
It is not surprising that under these circumstances, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) be-
came interested in the employment opportunities made available
to blacks within the police department. If police-community rela-
tions were at a low point, it may have been due, in part, to a pau-
city of low minority representation on the force. In 1970, Robert
Reinstein, a law professor and consultant to the General Counsel of
the NAACP, received a number of complaints from blacks who be-
lieved that they had been arbitrarily denied employment by the
police department. Thereafter, the NAACP spent several months
investigating both the. racial composition of the police department
and the racial breakdown of their new recruits." When the 1970
figures compared unfavorably with data from 1966, there was fur-
ther reason to suspect that the Commissioner's reputed racial bias
affected the hiring and promoting practices of the department.
These statistics were brought to the attention of the state's attor-
ney general who, in association with a group of rejected applicants
assembled by the NAACP, commenced a class action suit in De-
cember 1970 against those city officials responsible for the opera-
tion of the police department. The case was assigned to United
States District Judge John P. Fullam. Relying on the Civil Rights
Acts of 1871, the complaint charged the city with practicing racial
discrimination within the police department in violation of the
fourteenth amendment.3 The basis for this claim was the alleged
statistical disparity between the racial make-up of the police de-
19. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1967, at 123, col. 3.
20. See, e.g., Groutt, City of (Big) Brotherly Love, COMMONWFAL, May 1, 1970, at 167-69;
N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1970, at 48, col. 1.
21. See COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd sub nor. Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1975).
22. Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 24, 1970, at 5, col. 5.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1976). Plaintiffs, at that time, could not invoke title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 11977), as it was
not until 1972 that it was amended to reach municipalities. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972).
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partment (twenty percent black) and the racial make-up of the
city's population (thirty-five percent black).24 It was further
charged that the ratio of blacks to whites decreased sharply in the
high ranks of the department 5 and that since 1966 the racial bal-
ance had progressively deteriorated.26 According to the complaint,
while blacks comprised thirty percent of the recruits in 1966, by
1970 they represented only eight percent. 7 The complaint attrib-
uted this imbalance to a number of causes: 1) a written test for
applicants which was not job-related and which had a dispropor-
tionately negative impact on blacks; 2) a background investigation
of all applicants which was administered in a manner discrimina-
tory towards blacks; and 3) requirements for promotions, which in-
cluded a non-job-related written test and subjective evaluations of
past performance, which operated to disadvantage black police-
men.28 In addition to requesting that these practices cease, the in-
dividual plaintiffs demanded that they be hired immediately with
retroactive seniority and that the city be required to limit hiring to
blacks until the racial composition of the department reflected the
racial make-up of the applicant pool between 1966 and 1970. All
promotions were to be limited to blacks until the ratio of black to
white at each rank reflected the racial composition of the depart-
ment as a whole. Plaintiffs also requested that the department be
ordered to take steps necessary to maintain proper racial balance
and that the city's Commission on Human Relations be required to
establish procedures to carry out the mandate of its charter and to
prevent this kind of discrimination. All the charges were denied
by the city.
In April 1972, there were newspaper reports that the city was
preparing to hire two thousand police recruits."0 Though some dis-
covery remained to be completed, plaintiffs moved for a prelimi-
nary injunction to restrain hiring and promoting as outlined in
their complaint.3 After hearing five days of testimony, the court
24. See Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 966, 968 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
25. See Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1101 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
26. See id. at 1087.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See Complaint, Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970).
30. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction (filed
Apr. 13, 1972), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970).
31. See Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 345 F. Supp. 305, 306 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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issued a lengthy opinion in which it found enough evidence of dis-
crimination in both hiring and promoting to mandate preliminary
relief including the imposition of hiring quotas.3 It ordered the city
to refrain from further hiring or from making further promotions
unless it did so on the basis of at least one black for every two
whites."
The district court's order was initially vacated and remanded on
appeal, but when the case was reheard en banc, the court of ap-
peals affirmed the order with respect to hiring and vacated the de-
cision as to promotions .3 With regard to hiring, the order was af-
firmed simply because the issue had equally divided the circuit
court. 35 The court of appeals was puzzled about language in the
district court's opinion which questioned the "statistical signifi-
cance" of the evidence plaintiffs had introduced on the issue of pro-
motions.3 The court was unsure why, in spite of that uncertainty,
the district court had found enough evidence of discrimination in
promotions to justify a preliminary injunction. It therefore re-
manded that part of the order without prejudice to the granting of
further interim relief.37
On April 11, 1973, just over a month after the circuit court deci-
sion, a consent decree was entered which mooted the question of
further interim relief.3 The decree lifted the existing restraining or-
ders in exchange for a number of commitments by the city includ-
ing the following:
1) The city would develop a new job related written test for
police officer candidates and permit any black applicant to
reapply if, since 1969, he had been rejected on the basis of the
old written test.
2) The city would revise its standards for evaluation of back-
32. See 348 F. Supp. at 1086.
33. See id.
34. Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973). In its initial ruling, the court
of appeals misinterpreted the district court's order as requiring the city to hire blacks even if
they had not been shown qualified. Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, No. 72-1614 (3d Cir. Sept. 14,
1972); see 348 F. Supp. at 1106. The district court's order, however, specifically applied only
to blacks who had proven themselves qualified by being placed on the city's eligibility list.
See id. at 1106-07.
35. 473 F.2d at 1030.
36. Id. at 1031-32; see 348 F. Supp. at 1101.
37. 473 F.2d at 1031.
38. See Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8559 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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ground investigations to eliminate factors that operated to the
detriment of black applicants and would hire an independent
organization for advice on making the standards more job-re-
lated. Furthermore, those black applicants who, since 1969,
had been rejected because of background investigations would
be entitled to reapply.
3) Pending implementation of new job-related and non-dis-
criminatory background investigation criteria, all black appli-
cants (including those who reapplied) who had been rejected
on the basis of background investigations would be entitled to
appeal their rejections to a special review panel. The panel
would have three members, two appointed by the city and one
by the court. In case of a split decision, a further appeal
could be made directly to the court.
4) Black applicants found qualified after a second applica-
tion would be hired on a preferential basis and be given retro-
active seniority.
Although the city's record of compliance was far from perfect,
implementation of the decree substantially improved the hiring
prospects for black applicants. In May 1975, the new written test
was administered and, although black applicants still performed
worse than white applicants, the disparity had been reduced."9 Of
the 2800 blacks who passed, 286 took the exam for the second time
and were thus entitled to the preferential treatment provided for in
the consent decree; of that group, at least 116 were hired. 0 Of those
applicants who had initially been disqualified because of back-
ground investigations, at least 53 of the 216 blacks who reapplied
were favorably reevaluated and joined the department." In April
1976, new background investigation criteria were put into effect; it
was estimated that, as a result of the decree the black-white rejec-
tion differential was reduced from 2.6 to 1 to 1.6 to 1.2 The special
39. Sixty-four percent of the blacks passed, while whites passed at a rate of 91%. Phila-
delphia Inquirer, Jan. 9, 1976, at 3-B, col. 2. This meant that whites were performing 1.42
times better than blacks, an improvement over the old test where whites performed 1.82
times better than blacks. See 348 F. Supp. at 1089.
40. Interview with Alan Klein, counsel for plaintiffs (June 23, 1977).
41. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Back Pay and Additional Relief
(filed Aug. 20, 1975), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970).
42. See Memorandum and Order (filed Nov. 19, 1976) and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel
Production (filed July 27, 1976), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec.
21, 1970).
[Vol.'VIII
REFORM LITIGATION
review panel operated throughout most of this period and contin-
ued to function pending judicial validation of the new background
investigation standards.
Plaintiffs continued to challenge both the new written test and
the revised background review criteria as discriminatory. In 1976
and 1977 extensive hearings were held on these issues as well as on
the problem of discrimination in promotions. Plaintiffs were de-
manding reimposition of quotas in both areas. However the plain-
tiffs had informally suggested that, at least with regard to the
background review problem, they would settle for a modified ver-
sion of the existing system with the permanent establishment of a
special review panel." The promotions question was finally resolved
against the plaintiffs, but as of March, 1980, there had still been no
decision on the other issues."
B. The Brace Case
The genesis of this sex discrimination case was a long article
which appeared in the Sunday magazine of one of Philadelphia's
major newspapers during the summer of 1973." The article pur-
ported to show the police department's hostile attitude toward wo-
men. It described how the small number of policewomen (sixty-
four) on the force was restricted to the Juvenile Aid Diyision, how
they were never in a position of authority over male policemen,
how opportunities for promotion were much more limited than
those for men, and how the head of the Juvenile Aid Division was
opposed to giving women an expanded role in the department
equal to men, in part, for fear that too many lesbians would be
attracted to the job. The general tone of the article was quite criti-
cal, and pointed out that the Philadelphia Police Department was
behind other major cities in opening its doors to equal employment
for women.
43. The proposal involved using a number of specific criteria as automatic disqualifiers.
If none of these factors were present, the applicant would have to be approved unless the
department obtained a "variance" from the special review panel. Likewise, a "variance"
would have to be obtained if the department sought to hire someone with a disqualifying
factor. A rejected applicant could appeal to the panel only to contest the existence of such a
disqualifying factor. Interview with Alan Klein, counsel for plaintiffs, (June 23, 1977).
44. See Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 465 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Judge Fullam con-
cluded that, despite their racially disproportionate impact, the promotions tests met the
minimum critieria for job-relatedness. Id. at 465-66.
45. Philadelphia Inquirer, July 15, 1973, Today Magazine, at 8.
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Shortly after publication, the local chapter of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) announced that it would provide any wo-
men or concerned organization with lawyers and support services to
challenge the department's discriminatory practice." The offer was
accepted by Penelope Brace, a white policewoman with eight years
on the force. In July, 1973, she filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).' 7
Six months later, upon receiving statutory notice of the right to
sue," Brace brought a class action suit charging the city of Phila-
delphia with sex discrimination. In the meantime, the department
began to retaliate against her. 9 First, Brace was reassigned to the
division which was the most distant from her homeY° Police Com-
missioner O'Neill requested her file for his personal review and sev-
eral weeks later the Internal Security Unit of the department began
a surveillance which continued for over a month.51 Brace was re-
quired to undergo a special psychiatric examination. Finally,
charges serious enough to result in dismissal were filed against her
with the Police Board of Inquiry. This was the first time she had
ever been reprimanded for misconduct while on duty. It was al-
leged that on six occasions in September, 1973, she made false en-
tries in her "Patrol Log"; that she failed to report injuries sus-
tained in an off-duty accident; and, that on one occasion she had
improperly searched a female juvenile. Despite the intervention of
46. Id. Aug. 19, 1973, Today Magazine, at 22.
47. The EEOC was created in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
4 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977), for the purpose of correcting unlawful employment practices. H.R.
REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The EEOC investigates charges of discriminatory
employment practices and, if the charges are substantiated, it attempts to negotiate a solu-
tion with the employer. If they fail to reach an agreement, the EEOC is authorized to liti-
gate the dispute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976 & Supp. I 1977). The aggrieved party may
commence his own action if the EEOC does not sue the employer after conciliation discus-
sions fail. However, a jurisdictional prerequisite of the aggrieved party's action is the issu-
ance of a notice of right to sue by the EEOC. Once the notice is issued, the aggrieved party
has 90 days to commence an action against the employer. Id. See Bukes, Administrative
Prerequisites to Litigation Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Recent Develop-
ments, 17 DuQ. L. REV. 633 (1978-79) thereinafter cited as Bukes].
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977); see note 47 supra.
49. See description of alleged harassment in Complaint, Brace v. O'Neill, No. 74-339
(E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 12, 1974); Brace v. O'Neill, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 482 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
50. See Brace v. O'Neill, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 485, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
51. The city claimed that the surveillance was triggered by an anonymous letter. See
Defendants' Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (filed March 3, 1974),
Brace v. O'Neill, No. 74-339 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 12, 1974).
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the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), which
was investigating the allegations of discrimination, the charges
were heard by the Board in early January, 1974. A month later,
three days after her class action suit was filed, she was fired.52
In Brace's civil suit there were two categories of complaints:
those dealing with class claims and those relating to her alone. The
class claims alleged a general practice of sex discrimination by the
police department and were based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3)
and 1986, and on title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 The
factual predicate of these claims was simple: women were allegedly
excluded from the position of "policeman" and any jobs which re-
quired experience as a policeman. The effect of this exclusion, ac-
cording to the complaint, was that in excess of ninety-eight percent
of the jobs in the department were held by males. 4 The individual
claim was based on title VII and charged defendants with the ille-
gal pattern of harassment set forth above.5 Brace sought injunctive
relief and monetary damages on all counts.
A week after Penelope Brace filed her civil action, the Attorney
General of the United States filed a similar suit against the city of
Philadelphia." The complaint recited that the LEAA had been in-
vestigating charges of sex discrimination within the department
and had found their practices to be in violation of LEAA guidelines
but had been unable to secure voluntary compliance with those
guidelines."7 The remainder of the government complaint closely
paralleled Ms. Brace's allegations. The action was brought under
title VII; it sought to enjoin defendants' discriminatory practices
and to have defendants cease harassing employees who complain
about illegal discrimination." The government requested a new re-
cruitment program, fixed hiring goals, and monetary compensation
52. See 13 F,,r Empl. Prac. Cas. 485, 487.
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977). In count IV of the complaint
class relief was also sought on the basis of article I, § 28, of the Pennsylvania Constitution
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.
54. Brace v. O'Neill, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 482, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977) specifically prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee who "has made a charge, testified, assisted, or partici-
pated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under . . . [Title VIII."
56. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 573 F.2d 802, 804 (3d Cir. 1978); Brace v.
O'Neill, 567 F.2d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 1977).
57. See 573 F.2d at 804; see also Bukes, supra note 47.
58. 573 F.2d at 804.
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to those women aggrieved by defendants' discrimination. On the
same day the complaint was filed, the government also moved for
an order reinstating Ms. Brace to her former position on the force."
Both suits were assigned to United States District Judge Charles
R. Weiner and consolidated. Reflecting Judge Weiner's marked
penchant for negotiated solutions, the court tried to move the case
along through a series of interim agreements. Several times the
case was about to be heard by the court on application for major
injunctive relief when, at the eleventh hour, a compromise would
be worked out to postpone the pending adjudication. First, in May,
1974, plaintiffs postponed motions for preliminary relief because of
the city's promise to conduct an "in house" study of the ability of
women to perform police work. 0 Then, in January, 1975, considera-
tions of pending motions for preliminary relief were postponed
again when the city agreed that between forty and sixty women
(one half of its next police academy class) would be hired for a
study of the ability of women to do patrol work.' Plaintiffs, how-
ever, became dissatisfied because of delays in implementing the or-
der and, within several months, renewed their motions for prelimi-
nary relief. In early 1976, there were several days of hearings on the
motions before a ruling was postponed a third time by yet another
consent decree."2 This time, the city made three significant com-
mitments: first, it agreed to change job titles from "Policeman" to
"Police Officer" and from "Policewoman" to "Juvenile Aid Of-
ficer"; second, it agreed to give those policewomen then confined to
the Juvenile Aid Division an opportunity to transfer out of that
division to positions in the department previously held only by
men; and third, it promised that one hundred women would be
among the next 471 recruits that it would hire." The decree also
permitted the city to undertake a two year study of the ability of
women to do police work. The inclusion of this last provision was
59. See id. at 804 n.2.
60. Stipulation (filed May 7, 1974), United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-400
(E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974); Philadelphia Inquirer, May 8, 1974, at 3-6, col. 3; see text
accompanying notes 103-04 infra.
61. Order (filed Jan. 29, 1975), United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-400 (E.D.
Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974). The contemplated study never took place.
62. Order (filed March 3, 1976), Brace v. O'Neill, No. 74-339 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 12,
1974). See also 573 F.2d at 804-05.
63. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 162 (E.D. Pa.
1977); United States v. City of Philadelphia, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 167 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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important because it allowed the city to interpret its commitment
to hire the one hundred women as a limited short-term concession
solely for the purposes of the study. The court, however, saw the
city's commitment as much broader. Before the two years had run,
the city, on several occasions, sought to hire more than the 471
recruits anticipated in the consent decree. Each time, the court
ordered that it do so only on the condition that there be at least one
woman hired for every four men, a ratio that approximated the sex-
ual balance in the original 471.64 As a result, approximately two
hundred women recruits were hired between 1976 and June 1978.1
With the informal help of the court, Ms. Brace was reinstated to
her former job in May 1974; in July 1978, again due to court action,
she was promoted to detective.6 The court, however, denied her
the right to act as class representative and dismissed her harass-
ment claim against the city." Her appeal of those rulings was dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction because her case was viewed as being
too closely tied to the government's case to be heard alone." Ms.
Brace continued to be an active participant, joining with the gov-
ernment in many of their initiatives.
In June, 1978, the report of the city's study was finally submitted
to the court. Predictably, it found that women were generally un-
suited for patrol work. Further hearings were held and in February,
1979, the court formally ruled that the city's bar to the hiring of
women violated title VII." The city was ordered to cease any prac-
tice which had the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis
of sex and to submit for court approval new criteria for hiring and
promotion. The city appealed the decision and continued to ob-
struct the hiring of women.'" In September, 1979, the city sought to
64. See 17 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. 162, 167, aff'd, 573 F.2d 802 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 830 (1978).
65. See Memorandum of Plaintiff United States in Response to Defendant City of Phila-
delphia's Notification of Hiring (filed Oct. 27, 1977) and Defendants' Notification of Compli-
ance (filed Feb. 24, 1978), United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed
Feb. 19, 1974).
66. Order (filed July 3, 1978), Brace v. O'Neill, No. 74-339 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 12,
1974), aff'd, No. 78-2084 (3d Cir. Mar. 20, 1979).
67. See 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 484; 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 488.
68. Brace v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 1977).
69. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 849 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
70. For example, the city adopted a new physical fitness performance test as part of its
hiring examination which had the effect of excluding most women applicants. The use of
this test was enjoined by the court. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 20 Empl. Prac.
Dec. $ 30,277 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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enroll an all male police class. The court ordered at least one quar-
ter of the class had to be female.7 Little appears to have changed
and Judge Weiner's involvement in the affairs of the Philadelphia
Police Department is not likely to end soon.
III. The Problem of Representation
A. Participants in the O'Neill Case
The scope of the interests represented in O'Neill' was quite
broad. What began as a simple employment discrimination lawsuit
by several unsuccessful black police officer candidates against vari-
ous city officials mushroomed into a dispute involving representa-
tives of most of the interests that could be affected by the person-
nel policies of the police department.
The individual plaintiffs were first joined in their complaint by
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania suing as parens patriae on be-
half of its citizens to vindicate their general interest in eliminating
employment discrimination. The named plaintiffs were then for-
mally certified as class representatives. The class was made up of
all black men and women who, since January 1, 1966, had sought
or would seek to join the police department and all black .police-
men and policewomen who had sought or would seek to be pro-
moted within that same period.
On the defense side, the named city officials were joined by the
Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), the local police officer's union. It
intervened as an additional defendant to represent the interests of
all police officers, both black and white.72 The move was prompted
by the court's issuance in mid-1971 of a discovery order which, it
was feared, would improperly expose confidential police personnel
files.73 In addition to objecting to the discovery order, the FOP
joined the city in opposing the imposition of any kind of quota,
arguing that it would seriously impair the morale of the
department.
The FOP's participation alongside the defendants had raised
questions about the plaintiffs' claim to representation of active
71. See id.
72. See Transcript of hearing (filed July 5, 1971), Markert v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-1916
(E.D. Pa., filed Aug. 3, 1971). The intervention initially took the form of this separate law-
suit which the court construed as a petition to intervene.
73. See text accompanying notes 117-19 infra for a discussion of this discovery episode.
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black police officers.74 Doubts were resolved, however, when the
Guardian Civic League, the black police officers' association, inter-
vened on the side of the plaintiffs. It adopted essentially the same
complaint as filed by the original plaintiffs and was represented by
the same counsel.
Because of Brace, representation of black women posed a unique
problem. That case made it clear that the female element of the
plaintiff class had been doubly injured; not only had they suffered
because of their race but also because of their sex. However, most
of the remedies sought and obtained by the plaintiffs in O'Neill
were directed toward benefitting black males and in some instances
this ran counter to the efforts being made in the Brace suit to im-
prove the status of women."5 The problem was brought to the at-
tention of the court by a motion to intervene filed in January 1976.
Penelope Brace and Barbara Cassel, a black ex-policewoman and
therefore a member of the O'Neill class, formally sought to enter
the case on behalf of themselves and a class of all past, present and
potential female employees of the department. Limited interven-
tion was requested to establish some coordination between the
Brace and O'Neill suits and to insure that any relief granted in the
sex discrimination litigation would not be nullified by inconsistent
relief granted in the O'Neill case. Because of the special situation
of black women, one might have expected the court to welcome the
participation of these new representatives. All the parties, however,
opposed their intervention, fearing that after five years of litigation
the new arrivals and their new attorney would only further compli-
cate the lawsuit. The court agreed and intervention was denied."
B. Participants in the Brace Case
As in O'Neill, the Brace litigation enjoyed the participation of a
broad variety of groups and individuals. The consolidated litigation
was initiated by the United States and Ms. Brace against the city
of Philadelphia and the same assortment of city father defendants
74. The media have also noted discord over this suit among black policemen. Philadel-
phia Inquirer, Dec. 26, 1970, at 13, col. 3.
75. For example, in April, 1975, the city decided to enroll a small, all male, class at the
police academy. Efforts by the Brace plaintiffs to enjoin the class unless it included women
were opposed by the O'Neill plaintiffs because half the class enrollees were black men. The
class was not enjoined and it proceeded without the participation of women.
76. Order (filed Oct. 26, 1976), Brace v. O'Neill, No. 74-339 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 12,
1974). The court did give Ms. Brace's counsel permission to attend and observe proceedings.
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present in O'Neill. The FOP subsequently became a party and
other groups such as the NAACP, National Organization of Wo-
men, and Women Organized Against Rape appeared as amicus cu-
riae. There was also the participation of representatives from the
O'Neill litigation who attended several conferences.
The FOP's role in the case deserves special attention. It entered
the case as an intervening defendant and, until implementation of
the 1976 consent decree, had been firmly aligned with the city.
Since then, however, it has split with the city on several occasions
to support the plaintiffs. Thus, while it continued to oppose court
actions imposing hiring quotas on the city, it actively supported
those policewomen who sought to transfer to more desirable jobs
within the department. For example, its efforts led to a court order
restoring to her former rank of sergeant a policewoman who had
been punitively demoted because she sought to transfer out of the
Juvenile Aid Division." This unusual posture of the FOP, acting
sometimes as a plaintiff and sometimes as a defendant, is charac-
teristic of many participants in public interest litigation. The FOP
joined the litigation not because of a specific claim involving one of
the other parties but simply to protect the interests of its constitu-
ency. Among those interests was a general concern for the fair
treatment of all its members, including policewomen, and protec-
tion from what organized labor has regarded as a serious threat:
preferential treatment of women and minorities. In view of the
multiplicity of issues, the FOP had to act alternatively as an inter-
vening plaintiff or as an intervening defendant in order to advance
its interests.
Another unusual aspect of the case was the court's failure to
make use of the class action device. From the outset, Ms. Brace
77. Motion of Intervenor, Fraternal Order of Police, for Relief for Cecile Williams (filed
Dec. 17, 1976), United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19,
1974). Other actions include a request for the court to order the reassignment to non-sector
patrol duty of a woman, hired under the 1976 decree, who had become pregnant, Intervenor's
Motion for Relief to Officer Rita Royster (filed Dec. 30, 1976), United States v. City of Phila-
delphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974), denied by Order (filed March 25, 1977),
United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974), and a
request for an order compelling the city to cease the practice, adopted for the purpose of the
study, of assigning rookie officers to sector patrol duty without being accompanied by exper-
ienced officers, Motion of Intervenors, Fraternal Order of Police, for Preliminary Relief (filed
Jan. 3, 1977), United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19,
1974), denied by Order (filed March 24, 1977), United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-
400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974).
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had sought to be certified as a class representative for all present
and future policewomen. The court rejected her demands and re-
fused to give her case class status on the ground that the members
of her putative class were being adequately represented in the par-
allel government suit." However, despite the court's position, deny-
ing policewomen an advocate responsible solely to them could not
help but to adversely affect the quality of their representation.
That such a class representative was needed became apparent dur-
ing implementation of the 1976 consent decree. At that time many
individuals who would have been members of the class besieged the
court with petitions for intervention, for informal requests for assis-
tance and, in one instance, a separate class action law suit.79 These
individuals tended to fall into -two general categories: policewomen
applicants who felt they had been wrongfully denied employment"°
and veteran policewomen complaining that the city was not com-
plying properly with consent decree provisions enabling them to
transfer to better jobs." The court handled these claims as part of
its chore in policing the consent decree without, however, formally
authorizing new interventions into the case. Had there been a class
representative through whom these complaints eould have been
filtered much judicial energy would have been saved.
C. The Advocates
In large public interest suits, especially when class actions are
involved, counsel tends to play pivotal roles not only in formulating
strategy but also in controlling and defining the objectives of the
lawsuit. In many cases the named plaintiffs are simply individuals
who volunteer to be the tools with which others can attack an im-
portant local problem. Analyzing the lawyers and their affiliations
often provides further information about the interests being
represented.
78. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 485.
79. A group of women who had been found ineligible for or dismissed from the police
academy filed a separate class action suit. Sanford v. O'Neill, No. 78-1154 (E.D. Pa., filed
Apr. 10, 1978). The suit was dismissed upon motion for summary judgment. Opinion and
Order (filed May 17, 1979), Sanford v. O'Neill, No. 78-1154 (E.D. Pa., filed Apr. 10, 1978).
80. Motion of Darlene McGuire for Intervention as Party Plaintiff (filed May 14, 1976),
United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974); Motion of
Adelle McDermott to Intervene as Party Plaintiff (filed June 25, 1976), United States v. City
of Philadelphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974).
81. See discussion in Opinion and Order (filed Feb. 2, 1977), United States v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974).
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In O'Neill, for example, the individual plaintiffs and class repre-
sentatives were represented by the cluster of attorneys assembled
at the outset by the NAACP.2 It was these attorneys, in fact, who
were really in control of the litigation. Most of Penelope Brace's
attorneys were related in some way to the ACLU and one of them
was employed directly by that organization's national office. 3 Fur-
thermore, some of the applicants for intervention in Brace were
backed by lawyers from the Public Interest Law Center of Philadel-
phia (PILCOP) and Community Legal Services, a non-profit organ-
ization providing free legal services for the poor. Thus, the involve-
ment of several more community interest groups emerges when
attorney affiliations are examined.
D. Evaluation: The Adequacy of Community Representation
Although these employment discrimination cases involved only
the personnel practices of one city police department, they showed
how public interest litigation attracts the participation of a broad
spectrum of interests. Apart from the immediate victims of the al-
leged discrimination, the cases, between them, drew appearances
by the state and federal governments, the NAACP, the ACLU, the
National Organization of Women, the Fraternal Order of Police
and various other groups and individuals who felt they would be
affected by the outcome of the litigations. The real question,
though, is not how many advocates appeared, but rather whether
all affected interests were, in fact, adequately represented. It is
only when all affected receive meaningful representation that we
can be truly comfortable in using public interest litigation for so-
cial reform. Unfortunately, certain aspects of these cases suggested
cause for concern in this regard.
In O'Neill, for example, there were two occasions where the same
constituency was claimed by different advocates. At one point,
both the individual plaintiffs, who were not then members of the
82. This included a law professor and one of the largest and most prominent law firms in
Philadelphia. The NAACP was never formally a party to the suit although its general coun-
sel signed the complaint and it participated as amicus curiae in the appeal of the district
court's preliminary injunction.
83. As of mid-1978, she had had at least four attorneys. Her first, Steven Waxman, and
his replacement, Herbert Newburg, were connected with the Philadelphia chapter of the
ACLU. They were succeeded by Kathleen Peratis who worked directly for the ACLU's head
office in New York. She has also had one other attorney, Helen McCaffrey, who did not
appear affiliated with any particular group.
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police force, and the FOP claimed to speak for black policemen.
Later in the case, the legitimacy of the plaintiffs' claim to re-
present black women was challenged by Ms. Brace's and Ms. Cas-
sel's requests to intervene. How could the court know which advo-
cate really spoke for black police officers and which really spoke for
female police officers? The question could not have been answered
with any degree of certainty. Most likely there were some black
policemen who would defend the city as well as some black police-
women who felt that their opportunities were most seriously re-
stricted by discrimination against women. The only real solution in
these situations is to allow both points of view to be represented in
some fashion. This is especially important if the legitimacy of so-
cial reform litigation depends on the degree to which there is input
from all elements of the affected populations. However, this did not
occur in the case of black females and occurred with regard to
black males only because the FOP was made a party in its own
right. Similarly, in Brace, action was taken that was inconsistent
with effective community participation. A class action was never
certified and only one of the many petitions to intervene was for-
mally granted.
The experience of these cases obviously raises doubts about the
degree to which all interests will be effectively represented in these
kinds of cases. One problem is that the legal standards governing
expansion of the litigation through intervention and class represen-
tation are not concerned with maximizing input into the lawsuit
because they are not concerned with legitimizing social reform
through litigation. Rather, the standards are concerned primarily
with promoting judicial efficiency when dealing with multiple in-
terrelated but discrete legal disputes of the traditional variety."
These standards are sufficiently flexible, however, so that in each
of the instances referred to above a decision for or against expan-
sion of the litigation would have been defensible. This illustrates
how much the breadth of participation lies within the discretion of
the trial judge. Furthermore, with institutional reform litigation
becoming increasingly complex and often running on almost indefi-
nitely, a trial judge's decision on a procedural matter can become
practically unreviewable. With such power vested in the trial judge
and with the governing standards indifferent to the needs of insti-
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 & 24; Chayes, supra note 6, at 1289-92.
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tutional reform litigation, effective representation of all affected in-
terests so necessary to legitimiie the process of social reform can
never be assured.85
IV. The Problem of Remedy Formulation
A. The O'Neill Case
The shaping of the remedy in O'Neill took place essentially in
two steps. Judge Fullam took the first step by issuing a preliminary
injunction to require that any future hiring be in the ratio of one
black for every two whites."5 The second step was the substitution
of a consent decree for that quota order."7
The process began in April, 1972, when plaintiffs moved for a
preliminary injunction."8 During lengthy hearings they presented
statistical evidence showing that the police department's written
employment test and subsequent background investigation proce-
dures tended to eliminate a disproportionately large number of
black applicants." Given this prima facie case of discrimination,
the court was asked to order that the city hire only black appli-
cants, i.e., members of the plaintiff class, pending final resolution
of the case. Following completion of the hearings, Judge Fullam
urged the parties to meet and try to agree on their own to an ac-
ceptable arrangement for the protection of the plaintiff class. 0 It
was only after an agreement seemed unattainable that the court
acted."'
After issuing a lengthy opinion in which it made detailed find-
ings of discrimination, the court enjoined further hiring except on
the basis of one black for every two whites. 2 The court chose this
ratio as it represented approximately the racial make-up of the ap-
85. Professor Chayes points out that one of the features of public law litigation is the
important role played by the trial judge as "creator and manager of complex forms of ongo-
ing relief, which have widespread effects on persons not before the court and require the
judge's continuing involvement in administration and implementation." Chayes, supra note
6, at 1284.
86. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
87. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
88. See 345 F. Supp. at 306.
89. See id. at 307.
90. See id. at 306.
91. During negotiations, plaintiffs had softened their position to demand a one to one
black-white ratio. They reasoned that this would be an appropriate half-way measure be-
cause they believed the court could order that hiring be stopped altogether.
92. 348 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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plicant pool." This solution was preferred over the plaintiffs' re-
quest because it preserved the status quo and prevented further
discrimination without requiring the affirmative corrective steps
that would be implicit in an order limiting hiring exclusively to
blacks. Operating under 'a quota of any form was politically unac-
ceptable to the city and it appealed the court's order. The order
was first reversed, but then, after a rehearing en banc, it was
affirmed.'
When it appeared that the district court's order was going to
stand, the city began to negotiate seriously toward a solution less
offensive to them and the police union than operating under a
quota. It first promised to voluntarily reform its testing proce-
dures. 5 The question then became what substitute for the quota
order could be applied to govern hiring pending the development
and implementation of new procedures. During negotiations, in
which the court and all of the parties were involved, the city pro-
posed to eliminate some of the disqualifying factors used in the
background review which had been found to operate more harshly
against black applicants." It further proposed that any black dis-
qualified because of a background investigation be given the oppor-
tunity to appeal to a special review panel." The court's response to
the city's plan was quite enthusiastic, Judge Fullam suggesting
that it could form the basis for final relief in the case.8 Assuming
that an acceptable non-discriminatory written test could be pre-
pared, the proposal seemed to provide adequate protection for the
plaintiff class while being politically acceptable for the city.
Though at first insisting that a target quota be retained to insure
93. Id. at 1086.
94. 473 F.2d 1029, 1031 (3d Cir. 1973); see 348 F. Supp. at 1106-07.
95. This promise was first made by counsel for the city during oral arguments on the
appeal of the preliminary injunction order. See Transcript of Sept. 22, 1972 hearing (filed
Oct. 4, 1972), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970).
96. See 348 F. Supp. at 1092-101 for a thorough discussion of the background
investigation.
97. See Transcript of Jan. 10, 1973 conference (filed Jan. 12, 1973), Pennsylvania v.
O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970).
98. Judge Fullam had proposed a similar, but more limited, plan at an earlier meeting.
At that time, he suggested that all rejections after background review include a statement of
reasons for the rejection. The statement could be used as a basis for appeal to the court.
Plaintiffs believed such a procedure would prove too much of a burden to the court. Tran-
script of Sept. 22, 1972 hearing (filed Oct. 4, 1972), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, No. 70-3500
(E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970).
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the city's good faith, plaintiffs relented and agreed to a consent
decree based on the city's proposal.9 Plaintiffs exchanged the se-
curity of a quota for the commitment that, until they were finally
satisfied with the city's procedures, hiring would be limited to
filling vacancies without expanding the size of the department.
Background review standards were revised and the special review
panel was established. The panel had three members, one of whom
was unaffiliated with the city. Any panel decision that was not
unanimous was appealable to the district court. The decree also
gave to members of the plaintiff class who had been previously dis-
qualified the right to be reevaluated under the new procedures.
The decree was designed as a temporary measure to be operative
only until the city could devise and implement new hiring proce-
dures and prove them to be non-discriminatory. This has not been
done. In 1975 a revised written exam was administered and al-
though the performance of black applicants improved, they still
continued, as a group, to score much lower than white applicants.
Plaintiffs disputed the validity of the new test as well as the valid-
ity of new background review procedures implemented in 1976. The
court has not yet decided whether to approve the city's new proce-
dures. During this whole period the special review panel continued
to operate. In view of a proposal from plaintiffs that the panel con-
tinue to function indefinitely, it may become the basis for a final
decree, operating as a quasi-permanent institution to hear appeals
from black applicants who believe they were wrongly denied
employment.
B. The Brace Case
The evolution of remedial action in the Brace case was in
marked contrast to O'Neill. Brace progressed through a series of
ambiguously worded interim agreements all negotiated with the ac-
tive participation of the court. Each agreement or consent decree
gave plaintiffs a promise of further relief. However, because the
city was adamant in refusing to concede the fitness of women for
patrol work, 00 each was disguised as a short-term measure to test
the ability of women to do police work. Unfortunately, this allowed
the city to avoid its commitments by hiding behind the ambiguous
99. Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8559 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
100. See Brace v. O'Neill, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9012 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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wording of the decrees. Finally, in 1977, after three years of at-
tempts to compromise, the court began to force on the city its own
schedule for the hiring of women.
Judge Weiner's strong inclination towards negotiated solutions
was evident from the outset of the case. In lieu of ruling on early
motions to have Ms. Brace reinstated after she was fired, he met on
his own with top city officials to urge that she be rehired. 10' The
outcome of the meeting was a recommendation by the city officials
that Ms. Brace allow a pending appeal to the Civil Service Com-
mission run its course. Several week later the Commission ruled in
her favor and she was reinstated. 02
The court then persuaded plaintiffs to withhold action seeking a
preliminary injunction pending the completion of a projected "util-
ization study" that it had successfully urged the city to under-
take.0 3 The study would require that the city place women on pa-
trol duty and monitor their performance. The agreement broke
down, however, when, several months later, it was learned that the
city intended to employ only twenty-two women for the study. 104
Motions were then formally filed to preliminarily enjoin the police
department from continuing to discriminate against women and to
set up quotas in hiring and promotion to correct past
discrimination.
Although adjudication appeared inevitable, it was again post-
poned by a new agreement negotiated with the active participation
of the court. In January, 1975, just as hearings on the pending mo-
tions were to commence, proceedings were stayed with the an-
nouncement of a new study of women on patrol duty. This time,
however, the study period was specifically limited to six months
and the city was committed to hiring between forty and sixty
women. 105
The form of the agreement was an interesting illustration of the
101. Conference report (filed Apr. 9, 1974), Brace v. O'Neill, No. 74-339 (E.D. Pa., filed
Feb. 12, 1974).
102. The Commission decided that, while the charges against her had been substanti-
ated, they did not justify more than a suspension.
103. See Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 8, 1974, at 1-H, col. 3; Stipulation (filed May 7,
1974), United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974).
104. See Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 26, 1974, at 1-C, col. 2.
105. See Order (filed Jan. 29, 1975), United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-400
(E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974). Ms. Brace did not join in the agreement, seeing no purpose in
further delay.
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contortions that may be gone through in this type of litigation.
Rather than formulating a consent decree, the court issued an or-
der that was accompanied by a stipulation between counsel for the
United States and the city stating simply that such a study may be
of assistance to the court in resolving pending legal issues.' This
unusual procedure, designed to avoid the appearance that the city
had voluntarily agreed to hire women for patrol work, was probably
necessitated by the strong opposition from the mayor's office to the
making of any concessions." 7
Within a few months this agreement was also repudiated because
of an ambiguity in the court's order. Plaintiffs believed the six
month study was to begin with the next class at the police acad-
emy which they expected to commence in the very near future. The
city, however, interpreted it as beginning with the first class after
the administration of the revamped written test that had been pre-
pared for the O'Neill case. Although the order did contemplate
that the female recruits would be hired off the eligibility list to be
created from administration of the new test, it also stated without
qualification that the women would be hired in the "next class" at
the academy. This problem came to surface in April, 1975, three
months after the order, when a class commenced without any wo-
men on the ground that the new written test had yet to be given.
Plaintiffs realized then that under the city's interpretation of the
order it would be many months before the study would begin.
When the city refused to consider an alternate means of selecting
women for the study plaintiffs renewed their demands for a prelim-
inary injunction.
After much delay, hearings on the plaintiffs' motion began anew
in February, 1976. They were aborted in midstream and adjudica-
tion was again avoided when lengthy negotiations mediated by
Judge Weiner yielded yet another compromise agreement. The new
consent decree provided for another study of women as patrol of-
ficers, this time involving a minimum of 100 women to be hired
within nine months, the study itself to be completed within two
years. '0 As the city had represented that it was not planning to
106. See 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 486.
107. Several days after the order, Mayor Rizzo was quoted as saying that men and wo-
men would never occupy the same patrol car. Storck, A Charming Chauvinist, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Feb. 10, 1975, at 7-B, col. 1.
108. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1375, 1376
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
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hire more than 500 new recruits within that two year period, this
meant that 20% of them would be women. The decree also con-
tained elaborate provisions to allow for the transfer of women in
the Juvenile Aid Division to other more desirable positions within
the department.
Ambiguities in the decree, including the fact that affirmative hir-
ing commitments continued to be linked with performance studies,
again caused problems. In April, 1977, well before the two year pe-
riod had run, the city gave notice that it was going to hire several
hundred more recruits than had been projected. No provision for
such an eventuality had been made at the time of the consent de-
cree other than the city's promise, contained in a separate letter to
the government, to give sixty days notice of plans to hire in excess
of the projected number. As it turned out, only two weeks notice
was given of plans to exceed projections by enrolling an all male
recruit class at the police academy. 09 Plaintiffs sought a prelimi-
nary injunction, arguing that further hiring must conform to the
same 4 to 1 male/female ratio that had been in effect for the first
471 recruits. 110 The city, on-the other hand, denied that the decree
imposed any obligation beyond its hiring 100 women for the study.
The ambiguous nature of the decree had made it possible for both
sides to view its meaning quite differently.
There was no time for Judge Weiner to seek out an agreeable
compromise and for the first time he was forced to take significant
action without concurrence of the parties. Reflecting his perception
of the true meaning of the decree, he enjoined the start of the
pending recruit class unless at least twenty women were in-
cluded."' From that point on, the city refused to be a willing par-
ticipant in any further decrees. In early 1979 the court formally de-
clared that the city's policy was in violation of title VII."1 The
event did not change the city's attitude. In September, 1979, it
sought to enroll in the police academy an all-male class of 225 only
to be blocked by court order."' In the many months of Judge Wei-
109. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction (filed Apr.
11, 1977), United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974).
110. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 162 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
111. Id.
112. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 849 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
113. See United States v. Philadelphia, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,277 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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ner's attempts at conciliation it appeared that little in terms of re-
form had taken place.
C. Evaluation: The Role of Mediation
O'Neill and Brace presented their respective judges with a formi-
dable task: eradication of racial and gender-based discrimination
from within the Philadelphia Police Department. To varying de-
grees, the judges in both cases relied on their negotiations with the
parties to produce appropriate remedies. In employment discrimi-
nation cases the traditional judicial remedy, to be imposed after
hearings and formal argument, has been the quota. Apart from the
rising political pressure against the use of quotas, it is not really an
effective device for long term institutional reform as it fails to at-
tack the root causes of discrimination. Thus, it is hardly surprising
that these two judges looked away from the traditional approach to
seek other solutions through the more flexible method of informal
negotiations. Pursuit of the latter course did not mean that the
judges had relinquished their judicial responsibilities: on the con-
trary, both became involved, in varying degrees, in the negotiating
process. The roles they played were interesting ones: by their par-
ticipation they learned of the various alternative solutions most ac-
ceptable to each side, thus educating themselves should a ruling
ultimately have to be made; and through their comments they be-
came barometers suggesting to the parties what the outcome might
be if they failed to reach agreement." 4 What resulted were consent
decrees that were often better adapted to the particular character-
istics of each case than anything that could have been unilaterally
imposed by the court.
Given that negotiation or mediation must play an important role
in the process if institutional reform litigation is to be effective, the
question remains as to how it should be integrated with traditional
adjudication. Some light can be shed on this by analyzing these
two cases in terms of the relative mix of adjudication and media-
tion seen therein.
In Brace, the court showed a marked preference for resolving dis-
putes through negotiations and mediation. The case was character-
ized by incremental progression from consent order to consent or-
114. See, e.g., Transcript of Jan. 10, 1973 conference (filed Jan. 12, 1973), Pennsylvania
v, O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970).
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der. Fundamental disagreements were consequently never
addressed and ultimately when they could no longer be concealed
the court was forced to step in and order the city to hire women on
a quota basis. By contrast, in O'Neill the court's approach was
more traditional. Court adjudication of wrongdoing came very early
in the case and only then was followed by consent order remedies.
Judged in terms of their respective accomplishments, the O'Neill
approach must be considered the more effective. Although both
cases notably increased the number of women and blacks employed
as police officers, the O'Neill litigation produced a new, purport-
edly less biased written test, forced the city to revise its back-
ground review criteria, and created a special review panel designed
to insure that hiring practices remain non-discriminatory. Little in
terms of lasting reforms has yet to be produced by the Brace case.
Outside of public interest litigation it has become increasingly
common for lawsuits to be resolved through negotiation without the
court ever making a finding of liability. The extent of such negotia-
tions are usually confined to determining what amount of money
would be appropriate compensation for the plaintiff's loss. Once
agreement has been reached, the case ends and the parties may
have no further contact with each other. However, negotiating a
solution to a bona fide public interest suit against a large public
body presents quite different problems. The issue is never limited
to the simple question of how much, but rather the parties must
choose between an almost infinite variety of options. If there has
been no initial finding of wrongdoing, as in Brace, meaningful re-
sults may be very difficult to achieve. Defendants, clinging to the
hope of possible exoneration, will resist any long term solution.
Whatever concessions that are made are likely to be concealed so
as to avoid any admission of wrongdoing. While this is a common
practice in any negotiated settlement, it can be a particular prob-
lem in institutional reform suits where the terms of the negotiated
agreement have to be implemented over time by the litigants. In
Brace, the sharp disagreement over how to interpret the various
accords was common and could be attributed, in part, to the am-
biguous position of the litigation. For example, each side could le-
gitimately see the 1976 consent decree as either a permanent com-
mitment to affirmative action or a temporary accommodation for
the purpose of a study. The differences caused by such ambiguities
are likely to grow over time as leadership within the defendant in-
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stitution changes, further confusing any shared understanding.
When such negotiations take place only after a judicial finding of
wrongdoing, these problems are reduced. To begin with, focus of
the discussion is narrowed. The problem becomes what should be
done to correct what has been adjudicated as an institutionally de-
ficient arrangement rather than simply what might defendants do
to improve a presumably tolerable state of affairs. The reluctance
towards seeking long term solutions is reduced and since the reme-
dial objectives become clearer there is less likelihood 6f fundamen-
tal differences developing over the meaning of a consent decree. Fi-
nally, the fact that the court has made a formal finding of
wrongdoing gives much more weight to the ever present threat of
judicial coercion should a negotiated solution not be attained. In
O'Neill, the city knew from the outset that the court would act if
they would not agree to meaningful reforms, whereas in Brace this
message was much less clear until the very end.
An approach similar to the one used in O'Neill was suggested as
a model for all institutional reform cases in a recent law review
comment."' It was proposed that, after a judicial declaration that
violations of the law had been established, the defendant public
body should be given a series of opportunities to devise adequate
remedial measures. The court's function should be the supervision
of negotiations, stepping in to mandate its own solution only when
and if the negotiations proved fruitless.
Consultation and negotiation among the court and the parties
are essential to the effectiveness of public interest litigation. How-
ever, O'Neill and Brace indicate that they are devices best used
only after more traditional forms of adjudication have narrowed the
case to a question of appropriate remedies.
V. The Problem of Enforcement
A. Noncompliance With Discovery Orders
Enforcement of remedies and policing of consent decrees
presented unique problems in both cases because of Philadelphia's
particular political setting during the 1970's. City politics was dom-
inated by Mayor Frank Rizzo, the former police commissioner who
had risen through the ranks from patrolman. A vigorous and out-
spoken defender of the police department, he strongly resented the
115. See Developments-Section 1983, supra note 6, at 1247-50.
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charges of wrongdoing represented by the two lawsuits."' The atti-
tude of the city administration toward these suits can be best illus-
trated through an incident which occurred in 1971 as discovery was
beginning in the O'Neill case.
Plaintiffs wanted to inspect the background investigation files of
all job applicants over the past five years. They felt that review of
the files was essential if they were to determine why background
investigations disqualified blacks at twice the rate of whites. The
court agreed with the plaintiffs and on July 15, 1971, ordered that
the files be opened despite the city's objection that the integrity
and confidentiality of their investigations would be compromised."7
Several days later, on July 21, plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Sawyer, and
a number of law student assistants reported to the police commis-
sioner's office to begin reviewing the files. The time and place had
been prearranged with the city solicitor. Nonetheless, they encoun-
tered unusual, if not comic, resistance. At first they were told that
the commissioner was not expecting them and that he was unavail-
able. Next it was learned that he was out and that the inspection
could not begin until he approved the court order. After further
delays, Mr. Sawyer asked an official if he could see the senior of-
ficer on duty to present him with the order of the court. After mak-
ing inquiries, the official returned with the response that he was
not authorized to tell Mr. Sawyer who the senior officer was.' As
plaintiffs' frustration continued, a meeting was arranged for later
in the day between all counsel and the court. At that meeting the
city solicitor informed the court for the first time that the order
could not be complied with until approved by the mayor who was
then out of the country. Unimpressed, the court ordered that the
inspection begin the following morning. The next morning, Mr.
Sawyer was informed that the mayor had refused to permit compli-
ance with the order and that the city was filing a motion for rear-
gument. Later that day the court heard reargument, reaffirmed its
previous orders and directed that inspection commence forthwith.
Still, the police department refused to comply. On July 26 the
116. See Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 23, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
117. In the order compelling discovery, the court gave the city permission to blot out
names and addresses to protect the confidentiality of the files. Order (filed July 15, 1971),
Pennsylvania v.'O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970).
118. For a complete account of these events see Affidavit of Henry W. Sawyer, I (filed
July 3, 1971), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970).
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court of appeals denied the city's request for a stay and on the 28th
a contempt hearing was held by the district court. The city then
indicated that it was prepared to open the files for inspection only
if its most recent application for a stay was turned down by the
Supreme Court. Suggesting that its leniency was due to defend-
ants' status as public officials, the court imposed fines of $500
should there be immediate compliance with its order and $5,000 if
the city insisted on awaiting the outcome of its Supreme Court ap-
peal."' When, on August 3, Justice Brennan denied the application
for a stay the city finally opened its files for inspection.
Although the 1971 episode was the most dramatic example of the
city's resistance to court orders, it was just one of many occasions
in both suits where the city either balked at complying with a court
order or ignored commitments made in consent decrees. In O'Neill,
the city's record of compliance with the 1973 consent decree was
poor. It failed to give rejected black applicants the required notice
both of the reasons for their disqualification and of their right to
appeal.'12 It was several months late in providing plaintiffs with the
files of those rejected applicants who desired an appeal."2 ' It
delayed compensating the independent member of the special ap-
peals panel until he threatened to quit. 122 Under pressure to make
up for its poor performance, the city formally committed itself by
consent decree to refrain from all hiring until completion of the ap-
peals process for those rejected applicants then awaiting review.'2
119. See Transcript of July 27, 1971 hearing (filed July 30, 1971), Pennsylvania v.
O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970). There is no record that the fine was
paid.
120. Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt and Sanctions (filed July 25, 1974), Pennsylvania v.
O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970). After a hearing on July 31, 1974, the city
was found in contempt, fined $750 in counsel fees and given 10 days to complete notification
of the rejected applicants.
121. See Transcript of Nov. 26, 1973 conference (filed Dec. 7, 1973) and Defendants' Mo-
tion for Protective Order (filed Apr. 4, 1974), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D.
Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970).
122. The failure to pay the independent member of the review panel was raised in a
contempt motion. See note 121 supra. The court ordered the city to complete outstanding
payments within ten days. Several months later, the court was forced to act again because
the city refused to enter into a firm contract with that same panel member. The court or-
dered the city to submit an appropriate contract within five days. See Transcript of Oct. 17,
1974 hearing (filed Oct. 31, 1974), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec.
21, 1970).
123. Order (filed Apr. 4, 1974), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec.
21, 1970).
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Despite this commitment, new recruits were soon. hired and a new
class began training at the police academy, even though there were
appeals still pending. Because of possible hardship to those already
enrolled, the court declined plaintiffs' invitation to enjoin the class.
However, to temper the discouraging effect of "this latest example
of seeming intransigence," it ordered letters of apology sent to
those black applicants hurt by the city's conduct. 2 ' Due to plain-
tiffs' frustration with the city's recalcitrant behavior, they filed a
massive contempt motion in November, 1974.125 It recounted in de-
tail the many instances where the plaintiffs' counsel had to seek
the court's assistance to enforce outstanding court orders. 2" The
plaintiffs sought reimposition of a hiring quota as well as a penalty
assessment of $260,000 to be distributed among class members who
had been prejudiced by the delays. In view of the city's long history
of contumacious conduct, the motion was a significant test of the
court's willingness to defend the integrity of its process. The court's
response was simply not to rule on the motion.'27
The city's performance in Brace was not notably better. Its
promised studies of the performance of women on patrol duty were
forever being delayed. Although it had been ordered in 1977 to con-
tinue making twenty percent of its recruit classes female, only
11.5% of the next 450 recruits were women. 2 ' Especially trying was
the implementation of the transfer provisions in the 1976 consent
decree. Under that decree senior policewomen then in the Juvenile
Aid Division could transfer into other more desirable areas of the
department if they could demonstrate the equivalent of one year's
124. Memorandum Opinion and Order (filed Aug. 2,1974), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, No.
70-3500 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 21, 1970).
125. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt (filed Nov. 13, 1974), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill,
No. 70-3500 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 21, 1970).
126. According to their motion, plaintiffs were forced to seek the imposition of contempt
sanctions at least eight times in the past. Id.
127. Although the contempt motion itself remained undecided, Judge Fullam, in award-
ing attorneys' fees, took into consideration the efforts of plaintiffs' counsel in attempting to
obtain the city's compliance with court orders. See Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp.
700, 702-12 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
128. See Memorandum of Plaintiff United States in Response to Defendant City of Phil-
adelphia's Notification of Hiring (filed Oct. 27, 1977), United States v. City of Philadelphia,
No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974). Subsequently, the court ordered that further hir-
ing continue only if this deficiency were corrected. United States v. City of Philadelphia,
17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 166 (E.D. Pa. 1977); see also United States v. City of Philadelphia,
20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,277 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (police academy class enjoined unless one out
of four enrolled are women).
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experience in "police officer work."' 9 Otherwise transferees would
face demotion and assignment to sector patrol duty with all the
other new recruits.'3 Although the decree required it to act
"promptly," the city took six months to determine the degree of
"police officer work" experience in the transferees' backgrounds.
During that time, six of thirteen original applicants dropped out.
Police Commissioner O'Neill then found that none of them had any
of the necessary "police officer" experience though most of them
had been with the department for many years. Accordingly, they
were all assigned to the police academy to be retrained for sector
patrol duty. Exercising its right of review under the consent decree,
the court rejected the commissioner's findings and restrained the
city from assigning the transferees to sector patrol work. "' When
the city reacted by simply not reassigning any of the women out of
the police academy, the court specifically ordered that they be
transfered to non-sector patrol assignments. "2 It was only several
weeks later, after a contempt motion had been filed and after elab-
orate negotiations took place involving personal interviews between
the court and each of the seven women, that they were assigned to
non-sector patrol positions.'13
B. Evaluation: Coping With Noncompliance
Two types of city behavior were usually responsible for most of
the enforcement problems. Either court orders were openly defied
or else they were simply disregarded. What follows is a brief analy-
129. See 573 F.2d at 808-09.
130. The requirement that transferees have one year of "police officer work" or
equivalent experience was an intentionally ambiguous provision included to avoid the issue
of whether women who transferred would be required to do patrol work. Many policewomen
wanted the advantage of the greater mobility and increased opportunity for promotion avail-
able to policemen without having to do patrol work. The city, less eager to give women these
opportunities and anxious to prove them unsuited for police work, opposed giving women the
advantages of full equality within the department without also subjecting them to the rigors
of patrol duty. The ambiguous provision permits the issue to be confronted on a case by case
basis where factors such as the policewoman's prior experience and the type of work she
intended to perform (e.g., traffic control) would be considered.
131. Opinion and Order (filed Feb. 2, 1977), United States v. City of Philadelphia, No.
74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974); see 573 F.2d at 808-09.
132. Memorandum Opinion and Order (filed March 24, 1977), United States v. City
of Philadelphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974), aff'd, 573 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1978).
133. See Motion by the United States for an Order to Show Cause why Defendants
should not be found in Civil Contempt (filed May 3, 1977), United States v. City of Phila-
delphia, No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974).
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sis of these two forms of noncompliance with suggestions as to how
they might be controlled.
The threat of open defiance of court orders, although it occurred
only rarely in either case, is a serious problem in any public inter-
est suit where there is a public entity defendant. It is often argued
that successful defiance of judicial mandates will lead to a loss of
public respect for the judicial system."' Obviously, sustained and
open repudiation of judicial commands would seriously threaten
the continued viability of the rule of law. Short-lived defiant be-
havior which gives way to compliance, however, should not precipi-
tate such a crisis in credibility. This was the nature of the city's
resistance to the discovery orders in O'Neill, as well as its resis-
tance to the transfer of policewomen in Brace, and in neither in-
stance did the case suffer as a result. This is not to suggest that the
city's recalcitrance should be condoned. Nonetheless, recognition
must be afforded to the broad impact of minor orders in institu-
tional reform litigation and to the pressures exerted on public offi-
cials by adversely affected interest groups to resist such orders.
Some of this friction could be reduced if courts, as a policy, would
briefly postpone execution of potentially controversial orders. Such
advance notice would give the responsible authorities and affected
interests the opportunity to evaluate more rationally and deliber-
ately their predicaments. Further negotiations might ensue and an
outstanding order could be modified to be made more palatable. If
this approach were taken confrontations similar to those described
above could be avoided.
The most persistent enforcement problem witnessed in these
cases was the city's simple disregard, deliberate or otherwise, of its
legal obligations. This problem was most pronounced during imple-
mentation of the various consent decrees. Each time the plaintiffs
complained to the court the city would defend itself either by in-
voking a strained interpretation of its obligation, by citing limita-
tions upon personnel available to perform the particular task or by
simply pleading inadvertent neglect. One might have expected the
city to show greater goodwill in respecting the Brace consent de-
crees as, unlike O'Neill, they had not been negotiated under the
pressure of a judicial finding of wrongdoing. If there was any conse-
quent difference, it was not detectable from the city's behavior.
134. See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 5, at 475; Cox, supra note 5, at 103-07.
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Should the subtle resistance experienced in these cases be at all
representative of conduct in other institutional reform cases then
serious questions of manageability must be faced. Many of these
suits often culminate in consent decrees or court orders which re-
quire a complex reordering of the defendant's behavior well into
the future. If anything close to the degree of non-compliance seen
here can be expected, then enforcement of these remedies could tie
up judicial resources for years after the principal issues in the case
have been resolved. A partial solution to this problem* might be for
the court to establish independent monitoring bodies, akin to the
special review panel in O'Neill, to relieve the court of most of the
enforcement burden. Such bodies could be designed to oversee the
implementation of relief and be given the authority to find a defen-
dant in breach of its obligation and to order compliance)3 5 The ex-
tent to which the court's workload could be reduced would depend
on the degree of real power given to the monitoring agency. It is
possible that continued court involvement could be limited to re-
viewing an occasional progress report and to hearing appeals from
the monitoring agency of certain very important issues. Unless
some solution to these problems is found, institutional reform liti-
gation threatens to flounder because of its sheer unmanageability.
VI. Conclusion
In this article an attempt has been made to lay bare the mechan-
ics of institutional reform litigation as reflected through two cases
from Philadelphia. It is hoped that it will help the reader appreci-
ate the dynamics of this type of litigation as well as provide him
with some basis for an appraisal of its effectiveness. Furthermore,
in singling out for analysis three problem areas, an effort has been
made to highlight procedural concerns unique to this genre of liti-
gation that merit special attention.
It is important to analyze the functioning of these types of cases
for at least two reasons. First, institutional reform litigation shows
signs of being here to stay and, if so, the legal community has every
interest in learning how to make it work as effectively as possible.
Second, even if measures curtailing such litigation are feasible, to
do so would be undesirable given the positive contribution institu-
135. See Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 428, 459-60 (1977).
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tional reform litigation has made toward implementing social
change. It is thus important that these suits be studied, their fail-
ings analyzed and every effort made to insure their continued via-
bility. This article has explored only a few facets of the phenome-
non as reflected in the limited context of two large employment
discrimination suits. Institutional reform litigation extends over a
much broader area and it is hoped that this article will help en-
courage further study of the mechanics of the process in those other
contexts.

